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Supreme Court Review
Espaillat-Rodriguez v. The Queen [1964] S.C.R. 3.
T. E. J. McDONNELL4:
IMMIGRATION - NECESSrrY FOR MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND VISA
WHEN APPLICANT ALREADY IN CANADA.
Oh what could you do in a case like that,
What could you do but jump on your hat;
Or on your toothbrush,
Or your mother-in-law,
Or anything that's helpless.
Sandburg, A horse named BiZZ.
It has long been a presumption of the revenue law that there is no
equity in a taxing statute, and the recent decision of the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Espaillat-Rodriguez v. The Queen1
indicates that there may be no equity in the Immigration Act 2 either.
The case involved the rather special situation of an alien legally in
Canada on a diplomatic passport who was later desirous of taking up
permanent residence in Canada after leaving the employ of his
embassy.
The appellant, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, had legally
entered Canada in November, 1961. In January, 1962, he exchanged
his diplomatic passport for an ordinary passport. At the same time, he
lost his non-immigrant status, and, pursuant to s. 7 (3) of the Immigra-
tion Act he reported to an immigration officer and applied to become a
permanent resident of Canada. After a hearing before a Special Inquiry
Officer under ss. 27 and 28 of the Act, an order of deportation was
made against him on the ground that he was a person not entitled to
come into Canada as of right,3 and was a member of the prohibited
class described in s. 5 (t) of the Act (a general catch-all provision
excluding persons who do not otherwise comply with the Act or Regu-
lations) because (a) he was not in possession of a valid and subsisting
immigrant visa issued by a visa officer as required by s. 28 (1) of the
Immigration Regulations, Part I, and (b) his passport did not bear a
medical certificate duly signed by a medical officer, nor was he in
possession of a medical certificate in the form prescribed by the Minis-
ter as required by s. 29 (1) of the Regulations.
It was not disputed that the appellant was in excellent physical
condition, but the Department took the position that the lack of a
certificate and immigrant visa brought him within the class of pro-
hibited persons, as set out in the Act. An immigrant visa is merely the
signature of a visa officer (defined by Regulation 2(h) to be an immi-
gration officer stationed outside Canada, and authorized to issue visas)
and thus the effect of the order was to require the appellant to leave
*Mr. McDonnell is a third year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.1 [1964] S.C.R. 3.
2 R.S.C. 1952, c. 325.
3 S. 28(2) provides that only persons who are Canadian citizens or who
have a Canadian domicile are entitled to come into Canada as of right.
1965]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Canada in order to get back in again. As Ferguson J. observed in the
trial decision of Ex Parte Mannira, which dealt with an almost iden-
tical situation:
"If the applicant was otherwise entitled to remain in Canada the inquiry
took on a Gilbertian flavour - indeed, it became a farce in ordering the
applicant deported because he didn't have that which he was applying
so earnestly to get from the persons empowered to give it to him.4
In Espaillat, an appeal to the Immigration Appeal Board, under
s. 31 of the Act, was dismissed and the decision was subsequently
confirmed by the Minister. The appellant then brought proceedings by
way of certiorari to quash the deportation order on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The application was refused by the High Court,
and an appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed without reasons,
following the Mannira case. The appellant then appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
It may be convenient to note certain provisions of the Act and
Regulations at this point:
Section 7(3) of the Act provides that where a person who
entered Canada as a non-immigrant ceases to be a non-immigrant, he
shall present himself to the nearest immigration officer for an examin-
ation and shall, "for the purposes of the examination and all other
purposes under this Act be deemed to be a person seeking admission
to Canada."
Section 61 authorizes the Governor-in-Council to make regula-
tions concerning the "terms, conditions and requirements with respect
to the possession of . . . passports, visas, or other documents per-
taining to admission".
Regulation 28(1) is such a regulation, and provides that no im-
migrant shall be granted landing in Canada without an immigrant visa
issued to him by a visa officer.
Regulation 29 provides that no immigrant shall be granted
landing in Canada without a medical certificate.
Section 39 is a privative clause and provides that no order of the
Board shall be subject to review by the courts.
The appellant argued that the deportation order was ultra vires
the Special Inquiry Officer, either because Regulation 28 was not
applicable in this case, since it was intended to apply only to persons
seeking admission from outside Canada, or because it constituted an
improper delegation to specified immigration officials, since it pur-
ported to vest in them an absolute discretion to grant or refuse an
immigration visa. In addition, he argued that the order was ultra
vires because Regulation 29, in requiring that no immigrant should
be granted a landing in Canada without a medical certificate, neces-
sarily contemplated that the immigrant be given an opportunity to
4 (1959) 17 D.L.R. (2d) 482 (Ont. C.A.).
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appear before a medical officer who might grant or refuse a medical
certificate in accordance with the regulations and a deportation order
made on the basis of an absence of a medical certificate, when no
opportunity was given to afford one, was invalid. In fact, no oppor-
tunity had been given to the appellant to appear before a medical
officer, although he requested that he be allowed to do so.
The judgment of the majority of the court was delivered by
Abbott J., speaking for Taschereau C.J. and Judson and Hall JJ..
The learned judge dismissed the appeal and affirmed the order of
deportation. He felt that Section 7 (3) covered the situation and that
the appellant had no higher rights than a would-be immigrant
presenting himself at a port of entry for admission as a permanent
resident of Canada. He recognized that the Regulations contemplated
that persons seeking permanent admission should be examined abroad,
in the homeland of the prospective immigrant, and observed, without
comment, that "no doubt there are sound reasons for such a require-
ment".5 In addition, he pointed out that immigration officers at
points of entry in Canada are given no authority to grant such a
visa.
Judson J. stated that Regulation 28 was valid, without giving
reasons. He merely observed that "it [the power to grant visas] must
be entrusted to someone and the duty of such officers is to ascertain
whether or not an applicant for permanent landing in Canada comes
within one of the prohibited classes". 6 He concluded by observing that
since the order had been made under the authority of, and in com-
pliance with, the provisions of the Act, the court had no jurisdiction
to interfere with the order, because of Section 39.
Cartwright J. would have allowed the appeal on the ground
that Regulation 28 was inapplicable in this case. In his opinion, the
purpose of the Act as a whole was to regulate the admission to
Canada of persons who were neither Canadian citizens nor possessed
of Canadian domicile. By Sections 20(1) and 27 of the Act they
were entitled to a hearing, and if they could prove that they were
not within a prohibited class, they had a right to be admitted by a
Special Inquiry Officer. Regulation 28 was meant to apply to pros-
pective immigrants in foreign countries, and did not create an addi-
tional prohibited class; rather "it envisage[d] a preliminary inquiry
as to whether the appellant [fell] within any of the prohibited classes
already created."7 In other words, it was a procedural rather than
a substantive provision and thus was inapplicable to an applicant
already lawfully in Canada. The learned judge observed that to require
such a person to return to his own country for an examination would
5 Supra, footnote 1, at 8.
6 Id., at 17.
7 Cf. Attorney-GeneraZ for Canada v. Brent, [19641 S.C.R. 318, where it
was held that a Regulation delegating power to a Special Inquiry Officer todecide who should be allowed to enter Canada was ultra vires as an improper
delegation of discretion.
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be contrary to the maxim Zex neminem coget ad vana seu inutilia.
(The law compels no one to do useless things.) Thus the general
words with which s. 7(3) concludes (i.e., that when a person in
Canada ceases to be a non-immigrant, he shall "for the purposes of
the examination and all other purposes under this Act, be deemed to
be a person seeking admission to Canada) could not be applied literally
to a person already lawfully in Canada. He also pointed out that a
literal application of the section would render the inquiry, in cases
arising under Section 7(3), a mere formality that could only result
in the applicant being deported to his own country to be examined
there. Since the Act provides that an applicant is entitled to a hearing,
Section 7(3) should not be interpreted in a way which would effec-
tively take away this right.
Regulation 29 was construed in a similar way. Since the applicant
had not been given an opportunity to submit himself to a medical
examination, he had been denied the type of hearing to which under
the Act and the common law he was entitled. The Special Inquiry
Officer should have proceeded to inquire and decide if the appellant
was in fact a member of any prohibited class and should have given
him an opportunity to obtain a medical certificate. Since this was
not done, the deportation order was not made in accordance with the
provisions of the Act, and therefore should be quashed. Since the
deportation order had not been made in accordance with the Act
the privative clause was not applicable, and the court had jurisdiction
to quash the order.
It will be noted that the argument that Regulation 28 is proced-
ural depends, inter alia, on the conclusion that the Special Inquiry
Officer is under a duty to grant an immigrant visa to any applicant
who proves he is not within a prohibited class, as a matter of right.
In an obiter dictum, Cartwright J. expressed the view that if Regu-
lation 28 were not construed as casting such a duty on the Special
Inquiry Officer, then it was ultra vires, since it would leave it to the
uncontrolled discretion of that officer to grant or withhold the visa
as he saw fit.8
At first glance, the conclusion reached by Cartwright J. seems
more appealing than that reached by the majority, but it is submitted
that nonetheless the majority decision is correct. While it is true
that the situation in this case is one which arises very infrequently
and consequently may not have been contemplated expressly, by
Parliament, the judgment of Cartwright J., it is submitted with
respect, does not go far enough to justify changing the result arrived
at by the majority. The key to the decision is a determination of the
over-all purpose of the Act. Cartwright J. felt that an applicant was
entitled as a matter of right, on proving that he was not a member
of a prohibited class, to be admitted to Canada by a Special Inquiry
8 Supra, footnote 7.
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Officer. In light of the Brent9 decision, this must be so as regards the
Special Inquiry Officer, but it leaves unanswered the question of the
status of an applicant for landing in Canada generally, under the
Act. In other words, the position of the Special Inquiry Officer aside,
the question is whether any one is entitled to enter Canada as of
right if he complies with the provisions of the Act. It is submitted that
the answer must be in the negative. A reading of the Act as a whole
leads one to the conclusion that the Minister is given an overriding
discretion to determine who is and who is not a suitable immigrant.10
In the instant case, the appellant's position was reviewed on two
separate occasions by the Minister, and both times his application
was refused. Very little was said about this aspect of the case in
either of the judgments, and there was no indication that the Minister
had acted in bad faith in refusing the application. Consequently, even
if Cartwright J. was correct in holding that the deportation order
was ultra vires the Special Inquiry Officer, his judgment does not
get around the difficulty that the deportation order was confirmed by
the Minister in a valid exercise of his discretion, and consequently
was in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such being the
case, the privative clause was applicable and the court had no juris-
diction to quash the order.
CREDITORS RIGHTS
Canadian Admiral Corporation Limited v. L. F. Dommerich and
Company Incorporated, [1964] S.C.R. 238.
C. H. FOSTER "
CREDITORS' RIGHTS - BANKRUPTCY - RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF As-
SIGNEE OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND CREDITOR CLAIMING SET-OFF.
The problem facing the Supreme Court of Canada was whether
an assignee of accounts receivable, under a "factoring arrangement"
with its assignor, would be subject to a set-off arising from a subse-
quent purchase by the assignor from the firm that was indebted to
the assignor and whose account had been previously assigned to the
assignee.
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed both the trial decision
and that of the Ontario Court of Appeal1 and unanimously held that
a set-off could be exercised.
9 Ibid.10 Cf. Massella v. Langlais, [1955) S.C.R. 263 at 281, where Judson J.
expressed this view as to the purpose of the Act.
*Mr. Foster is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.1 [1962] O.R. 902.
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